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BOOK REVIEWS

Allen E. Buchanan, The Heart of
Human Rights (New York, Oxford
University Press, 2013), ISBN 9780-19-932538-2, 320 pages.
This is a massive book that covers so
much ground that nothing of review
length could do it justice, so I’ll focus on
what I believe is the most interesting and
fruitful aspect of the book—its assessment
of whether the legal order of international
human rights is, at present, capable of
anything more than a diagnosis of global
problems. Put otherwise, can this system
to which so many look for remedies
actually offer remedies, or is something
more needed to fix the world’s more
entrenched forms of injustice?
Before we dive into that question, let
us glance at the book’s broader ambitions.
Allen Buchanan does a good job taking
the reader through many of the dominant
schools of philosophical thought about
human rights, asking whether any offer
adequate justification for their positions.
He does justice to what each position
asserts but ultimately argues for taking
international human rights as a legal practice to be viewed instrumentally for its
usefulness rather than as a “mirror” to any
one set of original principles. Concerns
that rights discourse is too individualistic
are overstated, Buchanan insists, because
human rights always focus on the social
setting in which conditions for leading a
good life must transpire. We just do live
with others, and rights discourse is one
way we have found to manage conflicts
that inevitably arise between persons and
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groups. Many who argue for rights for
individuals on a priori grounds of human
dignity worry that any other approach
threatens to sacrifice individuals to consequentialism, but Buchanan contends
that one can recognize the importance
of securing public goods without denying
protection to individuals. He also reminds
us that protecting individuals does not
solve every problem of injustice, as rights
regimes can coincide with systemic discrimination. One must look at the small
and large pictures simultaneously in order
to do justice.
That is why Buchanan argues for an
“ecological” view of the legitimacy of
human rights legal institutions: “it is often
not possible to determine the legitimacy
of an institution in isolation; instead, its
legitimacy may be a function of how it
fits into a network of institutions.”1 If we
think of the legitimacy of international
human rights law in this way, the question
is not only whether the United Nations
Security Council, treaty-making bodies,
or the International Criminal Court are
legitimate, but how all these parts of the
larger whole operate together to provide
what constituents need and expect. And
if that is how legitimacy is created, then
there is also room for nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in international
human rights law, even though they are,
as Buchanan puts it, “reliable external
agents to gather and integrate the information and make it available in understandable form to relevant stakeholders.”2
So, though NGOs are external to states,
and must be in order to be legitimate,
that legitimacy also depends on how their
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work serves the legitimacy of states by
offering neutral judgments about states’
human rights records.
The worry remains that a robust
international system is not compatible
with individual states’ constitutional
democracies. Buchanan visits both sides
of the problem and argues that, though
international human rights law may
modify constitutional democracies’
policies, at times without democratic
authorization, the risk may not be more
weighty than that posed by the kind of
indeterminacy that always is part of law.
He adds, however, that one should not
blithely dismiss concerns about loss of
self-determination when international law
is not treated carefully by domestic jurisdictions. Instead of posing the problem as
a false dilemma—international rights or
domestic constitution—Buchanan recommends judgment: the common practice
of balancing competing values.
That leads us back to his main idea:
human rights as they are practiced at
present are largely a legal phenomenon
(which means we escape the need to
agree on a moral foundation for them),
and the legal system created to express
them may not be up to some of the
larger tasks that proponents of human
rights might expect the system to fulfill.
Per Buchanan, “the most basic idea of
the international legal human rights
system is to use international law to set
standards for how all states are to treat
individuals under their jurisdiction, for
the sake of those individuals themselves,
considered as social beings, rather than
for the sake of promoting state interests.”3
The fact that there is such a system is no
small achievement, if one steps back and
looks at the history of state relations. As
Buchanan points out, it very easily could
3.
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have never come to pass that an international order of states would concern
itself with individual human beings. But
the existing international “regime” of
human rights that does provide protections to many, if imperfectly, is still blind
to larger, deeper conditions of inequality in which it is complicit (in part due
to that blindness). Buchanan does a
good job balancing between idealism
and pragmatism in his discussion of
the limitations of human rights norms
at present and what remedies might be
possible. He reminds us that the field of
international human rights law does not
currently have any way of regulating how
non-state actors influence human rights
abuses—the International Monetary Fund
and World Trade Organization are not
subject to human rights conventions,
though states cooperating together could
make such enforcement possible; the
international order is also very shaky on
how to respond to states that do not fulfill their obligations to protect their own
citizens—whether the danger comes from
inter- or intra-state conflict or widespread
neglect of the well-being of those who
reside in a territory; and the system of
global human rights has not figured out
how to think meaningfully (let alone act)
about structural violence built into its
own composition.
This last truth forces us, Buchanan
argues, to “be more critical about the
very meaning of the commitment to
affirming and protecting basic equal
status that I have said is central to the
international human rights enterprise.”4
At present, it seems most states adhere
to what Buchanan calls an intra-societal
interpretation of the commitment to
protecting human rights: states protect
their own citizens and expect others to

242

HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

do the same. But if we switch to a global
interpretation, international human rights
law is given a more ambitious set of goals:
protecting all human beings from abuse,
regardless of the territory in which they
live. Such an ambition is clearly found
within the philosophical underpinnings
of human rights, but has not yet been
formed into compelling institutional rules
and practices. Nonetheless, Buchanan
contends, it is hard to make an argument
(philosophical or pragmatic) in favor of
equal status of persons within states without implying that persons ought also to be
equal regardless of where they “belong.”
So we are left with an exigency—to
grant meaningful human rights to all human beings—in a regime of human rights
law that cannot live up to the task. Human rights law can diagnose the problem,
but is unable to solve it. Buchanan does
not think this renders human rights law
meaningless, as it would be wrong to assume any one instrument could solve all
of the world’s problems: “the problem is
not lack of legal coverage. The problem is
that so far the Practice has not developed
adequate mechanisms, whether legal
or political, for ensuring that the most
basic social and economic rights (and
economic liberties) of people in the less
economically developed countries are
realized.”5 If the Western world has not
found a practice that would live up to
its human rights ambitions, that may be
so, not because the West has formulated
rules that benefit its privileged citizens
rather than those less well off, Buchanan
speculates, but because the founders of
international legal human rights have
“overgeneralized from the experience of
economic prosperity in the West. They
may not have appreciated how difficult
it would prove to be for many countries
5.
6.
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to achieve the adequate standard of living
to which the system says each individual
has an international legal human right.”6
And if that is true, what is owed may be
more than formal equality can provide.
Buchanan may be right that this failing
is due to an oversight of the founders;
however, it is one deeply entrenched in
the liberal rights tradition, as one can
see from the history of arguments over
whether political and civil rights should
be ranked higher than social, economic,
and cultural rights. If “the West” has argued for that ranking, part of the reason
for that preference will be philosophical
or ideological, although part also will
have been pragmatic. It is easier to provide formal equality than it is to create
meaningful equality.
It is relatively easy to determine who
must act when we say that states are
responsible for protecting their own.
Governments must act, and governments
are responsible, when that is the standard.
But if injustice is built into the global
structure, then even in a world where all
governments fulfilled their human rights
duties, some lives would not be granted
minimal conditions of human thriving.
That is where it becomes difficult to determine who or what is responsible for
fixing the problem.
It is an important point. I find it interesting, then, that Buchanan does not
really develop a theory of responsibility.
What he argues seems to require that
those who care about human rights
reform their understanding of responsibility, so that it becomes something other
than the kind of legal culpability where
agents are responsible only for their acts
and formal/legal equality gets equality’s
job done. Such a reformed understanding may be difficult to manage if a legal

2015

Book Reviews

order is, as his title suggests, the heart of
human rights. But even though Buchanan
does not take up a theory of responsibility directly, he does show that, in order
to remedy the problem, we will need
more than the current system. States
need to create and take on new duties,
and this might be better expressed in a
vocabulary of fairness rather than rights,
Buchanan suggests. In other words, a
system of human rights needs more
than rights in order to make good on
its promises. Buchanan believes that
this can be achieved by a new kind of
international law. One could also argue
that something other than law is needed
here—without slipping back into the argument about moral grounding, which I
do think Buchanan is right to step away
from in this book. Buchanan’s aims are
reformist rather than revolutionary, as he
argues in his chapter on ethical pluralism. I agree with him that it may not be
wise to “throw out” human rights when
that discourse has clearly lent support to
so many struggles for self-determination
for both groups and individuals. What
I do not see, however, is how states or
persons end up creating and taking on the
new duties that a global form of human
rights would require without a theory of
responsibility—a real revision of how the
rights tradition describes responsibility
and its limits.
When we think of ourselves as consenting to duties, it is easy to think we
do not owe things to people far away or
that we are not responsible for things we
did not directly do. That kind of reasoning
will likely not be up to the task put before
us by the more ambitious form of human
rights that Buchanan describes. So, rather
than arguing about moral grounding or
resting satisfied with a narrative of state
responsibility, those who care about
human rights need to admit that its full
realization is compatible with wide-scale
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deprivation, and, for that reason, they
ought to begin reformulating what it
means to be responsible for justice. Such
a responsibility will not only be the result
of culpable acts or sovereign duty, but
also of acknowledgement of the human
condition: the human world is built by
human beings (and states) responding
to each other, for better and for worse.
We are affected by others whether we
like it or not—that is both a real limit
to consent theory and a reason why we
want equality and rights protections in the
first place. Buchanan argues something
similar, but I want to hear more about
what it is, beyond law, that will get that
work done. It may be that in wanting
that I have fallen farther on the side
of idealism than legalism would allow.
But I also think that seeking out a new
theory of responsibility for justice is as
pragmatic as it is idealist. When questions
arise about why, if we care about human
rights, individuals or states may owe more
than what they would consent to owe,
the grounding does not come only from
law or moral philosophy, but also from
practical realism: how else will the job
of human rights get done?
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